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Private Compensation and Organizational Design

Qing Liu, Lucy White , Andrea Buffa   Sep 15,2021

Most of the literature on organizational design and incentives assumes public contracting. Yet most real world compensation contracts are private... Read More

Model Secrecy and Stress Tests

Basil Williams , Yaron Leitner   Aug 29,2020

We study whether regulators should reveal the models they use to stress test banks. In our setting, revealing leads to... Read More

Monitor Reputation and Transparency

Ivan Marinovic , Martin Szydlowski   Sep 22,2020

We study the disclosure policy of a regulator overseeing a monitor with reputation concerns, such as a bank or... Read More

Risk seekers: trade, noise, and the rationalizing effect of market impact on convex preferences

Efstathios Avdis   Oct 08,2020

Long-held intuition dictates that information-based trade is impossible without exogenous noise. Risk seekers can resolve this conundrum. Even though such... Read More

Open Banking: Credit Market Competition When Borrowers Own the Data

Jing Huang,Jidong Zhou, Zhiguo He   Nov 24,2020

Open banking facilitates data sharing consented by customers who generate the data, with a regulatory goal of promoting competition between... Read More

The Insurance is the Lemon: Failing to Index Contracts

Benjamin Hebert , Barney Hartman-Glaser   Jan 07,2019

We model the widespread failure of contracts to share risk using available indices. A borrower and lender can share risk... Read More

Liquidity Sentiments

Brett Green , Vladimir Asriyan William Fuchs   Mar 12,2019

We develop a rational theory of liquidity sentiments in which the market outcome in any given period depends on agents' expectations... Read More

Aggregation and Design of Information in Markets with Adverse Selection

Brett Green , William Fuchs , Vladimir Asriyan   Nov 05,20190

How effectively does a decentralized marketplace aggregate information that is dispersed throughout the economy? We study this question in a... Read More

The Good, the Bad, and the Complex: Product Design with Imperfect Information

Dana Foarta, Vladimir Asriyan Victoria Vanasco   Nov 05,20190

This paper explores the incentives of product designers to complexify products, and the resulting implications for overall product quality. In... Read More

Optimal Contracting and the Organization of Knowledge

luis garicano,luis rayo, William Fuchs   Jul 30,2018

We study contractual arrangements that support an efficient use of time in a knowledge- intensive economy in which agents... Read More