Joel M. Vanden, Diego Garcia Aug 02,2023
Working Paper No.00114-00
We study the size and the existence of the mutual fund industry by generalizing the standard competitive noisy rational expectations... Read More
Günter Strobl , Diego Garcia Aug 02,2023
Working Paper No.00115-00
This paper studies how relative consumption effects, in which a person's satisfaction with their own consumption depends on how much... Read More
Francesco Sangiorgi , Diego Garcia Aug 02,2023
Working Paper No.00116-00
We study information sales in financial markets with strategic risk-averse traders. Our main result establishes that the optimal selling mechanism... Read More
Dirk Hackbarth, Paolo Fulghieri , Diego Garcia Aug 02,2023
Working Paper No.00117-00
We study a security design problem under asymmetric information, in the spirit of Myers and Majluf (1984). We introduce a... Read More
Philip Bond , Diego Garcia Aug 02,2023
Working Paper No.00118-00
We develop a benchmark model to study the equilibrium consequences of indexing in a standard rational expectations setting. Individuals incur... Read More
Diego Garcia Aug 02,2023
Working Paper No.00119-00
This paper considers an optimal contracting problem between an informed risk-averse agent and a principal, when the agent needs to... Read More
Branko Urosevic, Diego Garcia Aug 02,2023
Working Paper No.00120-00
We study a novel class of noisy rational expectations equilibria in markets with large number of agents. We show that,... Read More
Linda Schilling Aug 03,2023
Working Paper No.00123-00
Policy makers have developed different forms of policy intervention for stopping, or preventing runs on financial firms. This paper... Read More
Maren Vairo, Piotr Dworczak Aug 11,2023
Working Paper No.00125-00
Financial over-the-counter markets have been traditionally very opaque. Recent regulation promotes transparency in some of these markets by lowering search... Read More
Thomas Philippon, Cecilia Parlatore Sep 25,2023
Working Paper No.00074-01
We study the optimal design of stress scenarios. A principal manages the unknown risk exposures of agents by asking them to... Read More