christoph frei, Markus Baldauf Joshua Mollner Jun 12,2024
Working Paper No.00095-02
We study the optimal execution problem in a principal-agent setting. A client contracts to purchase from a dealer. The dealer... Read More
Published: Journal of Financial Economics, 2024, 160(), 103901-Nicolas Figueroa, Nicolas Inostroza Apr 26,2023
Working Paper No.00097-00
A liquidity-constrained asset owner designs an asset-backed security to raise funds from an informed liquidity supplier. Information insensitive securities reduce... Read More
Sushil Bikhchandani,omer tamuz,ivo welch, David Hirshleifer Jul 11,2023
Working Paper No.00104-00
We review the theory of information cascades and social learning. Our goal is to describe in a relatively integrated and... Read More
Anton Tsoy , Nicolas Inostroza Jul 11,2023
Working Paper No.00105-00
An asset owner designs an asset-backed security and a signal about its value. After privately observing the signal, he sells... Read More
Kostas Koufopoulos (York), Pavel Zryumov , Giulio Trigilia Jul 11,2023
Working Paper No.00106-00
We show that short-term debt in a firm’s optimal capital structure reduces investment under asymmetric information. Investors’ interpretation of underinvestment... Read More
Thomas Philippon, Cecilia Parlatore Sep 25,2023
Working Paper No.00074-01
We study the optimal design of stress scenarios. A principal manages the unknown risk exposures of agents by asking them to... Read More
Thomas Philippon, Cecilia Parlatore Sep 25,2023
Working Paper No.00074-01
We study the optimal design of stress scenarios. A principal manages the unknown risk exposures of agents by asking them to... Read More
Alejandro Rivera Sep 27,2023
Working Paper No.00128-00
This paper develops a methodology to solve dynamic principal-agent problems in which the agent features present-biased time preferences and naive... Read More
Qing Liu, Lucy White Andrea Buffa Nov 18,2022
Working Paper No.00073-01
Agents working together to produce a joint output care about each other’s incentives. Because real world contracts are typically private... Read More
Benjamin Hebert , Barney Hartman-Glaser Jan 08,2019
Working Paper No.00049-00
We model the widespread failure of contracts to share risk using available indices. A borrower and lender can share risk... Read More