A monopolist data seller designs and sells signals about borrower quality to competing lenders. Optimal signals raise lenders' profits, and hence seller revenue, by softening lending competition through two channels. Segmentation negatively...

We study dynamic mechanism design in expert relationships, such as those arising in healthcare, legal services, consulting, and asset management. An expert privately observes progress in resolving a client's problem. The client pays a fixed price...

We study the optimal allocation of tasks over the life cycle of an innovative project. Innovation requires two complementary activities, research and development, both subject to moral hazard. Agents also privately observe the quality of discoveries, so the principal must...

We study third-party data sharing---the sale of consumer data generated as a by-product of ordinary transactions---in a framework with a monopolistic seller, a privately informed consumer, and a third party whose data use imposes privacy costs on the consumer. Our...

Why do banks fund illiquid, informationally sensitive assets with short-term, often demandable debt? We develop a model in which banks' reliance on short-term debt makes their assets more liquid. Because banks monitor and collect information about borrowers, adverse selection makes...

We study how artificial intelligence affects welfare in general equilibrium when production requires both finding and solving problems. Unsolved problems are unexploited opportunities or unmet needs that agents find in a congested sector. Problems are solved in layered hierarchies in...