Papers
Uploaded: Feb 17, 2026
Multilateral Contracting in Stage Financing
Venture capital financing typically features complex securities and staging. We develop a dynamic contracting model where an entrepreneur seeks financing from active investors (who provide costly monitoring and screening) and passive investors (who offer cheaper capital). Under multilateral moral hazard,...
Uploaded: Feb 17, 2026
Student Loans and Labor Supply Incentives
We develop a dynamic household finance model showing that student loans -- non-dischargeable in the U.S. bankruptcy -- alleviate the well-documented debt overhang in labor supply decisions. Non-dischargeability mutes opportunities for households to strategically reduce labor supply at the expense...
Uploaded: Feb 17, 2026
Optimal Contract with Aspirational Utility
This paper characterizes the optimal contract when the agent is endowed with aspirational utility. Our analysis reveals that effort and aspirations act as complements: the principal utilizes aspirational ``boosters'' to induce local risk-loving behavior, reducing the welfare costs of incentives...
Uploaded: Feb 17, 2026
The nonstationarity-complexity tradeoff in return prediction
We study machine learning models for stock return prediction in non-stationary environments
and identify a fundamental nonstationarityācomplexity tradeoff: more complex models reduce
misspecification error but require longer training windows that exacerbate non-stationarity.
We address this tension with a novel tournament-based model selection procedure...
Uploaded: Feb 11, 2026
Tech-Driven Intermediation in the Originate-to-Distribute Model
This paper develops a general equilibrium model to examine the role of information technology when intermediaries facilitate the origination and distribution of assets given information asymmetry. Information technology measures the informativeness of asset-quality signals received by intermediaries, who purchase assets...
Uploaded: Feb 1, 2026
Markets for Price Risk
Financial derivatives, such as futures, options, and swaps, are not contracts on exogenous states of the world, as in Arrow (1964): their payoffs depend on the endogenous market prices of certain goods. How well do markets for price risk approximate...