We study optimal incentive contracts when workers privately observe whether Agentic AI can automate their jobs. Firms balance bonuses for truthful reports of successful automation with termination threats. Workers may be fired regardless of automation success (\textit{mass termination}), even though...

We introduce nonrival public goods into global games of regime change and rationalize investor behavior in the Euro crisis, the collapse of Terra, and the 2023 bank runs. Each investor in a large project is vanishingly unlikely to be pivotal...

With complete-information bilateral bargaining in network settings, holdup is eliminated when contracts across the network are agreed atomically (all or none) via a smart contract. Applications include over-the-counter trading, syndicated lending, multi-tranche securitizations, third-party financed purchases, and bookbuilding. Under a...

We develop a unified theory of delegated capital management that extends the competitive, rational-expectations paradigm of Berk and Green (2004) from mutual funds to alternative assets. With perfectly competitive capital markets, we derive the optimal contract and account for observed...

We develop a methodology to measure market expectations of the long-run impact of monetary policy from asset prices using the operator approach of Hansen

and Scheinkman (2009). We show that the ratio of long term equity returns to long term bond...

We develop a dynamic contracting framework to study how partial commitment power affects long term employment relationships. In a continuous time moral hazard model, the principal can alter the contract at random, exogenously timed “alteration opportunities,” with their arrival rate...