We show theoretically that, in the presence of persistent productivity shocks, the reliance on self-enforcing contracts due to limited legal enforcement may provide a possible rationale why countries with the worse rule of law might exhibit: (i) higher aggregate TFP...

I analyze a dynamic model of concurrent bargaining in which multiple prospective buyers compete to trade with an informed seller. When the seller maintains confidentiality over buyers' past offers, buyers may engage in competitive ``price experimentation'': buyers risk early losses...

We study a continuous-time model of joint leverage and liquidity management, when shareholders cannot commit to future financial policies. Our model yields a closed-form characterization of equilibrium financial policies and asset pricing dynamics. While shareholders typically resist debt reductions to...

What does market power look like in a data economy? We model data as fuel for prediction and study how it changes measured markups. Data has ambiguous effects on product markups: By reducing risk, it lowers markups. By prompting investment,...

Conventional wisdom holds that an incumbent bank would never voluntarily share proprietary borrower data with a competing lender. We study lending competition in which the incumbent owns data that generate informative signals about borrower quality and chooses how much to...

We study the sale of operating assets when the seller retains a financial stake and privately observes how valuable the asset will be under different buyers, developing a first-price scoring auction in which allocation depends on both bids and buyer...