Loan rates are usually viewed as prices that shape borrower incentives, but they can also serve another role in a principal-agent problem by determining how informative repayment is about unobservable effort inside the bank. I study how the two roles...

We show theoretically that, in the presence of persistent productivity shocks, the reliance on self-enforcing contracts due to limited legal enforcement may provide a possible rationale why countries with the worse rule of law might exhibit: (i) higher aggregate TFP...

I analyze a dynamic model of concurrent bargaining in which multiple prospective buyers compete to trade with an informed seller. When the seller maintains confidentiality over buyers' past offers, buyers may engage in competitive ``price experimentation'': buyers risk early losses...

We study a continuous-time model of joint leverage and liquidity management without commitment. Our model highlights how cash reserves shape capital structure policy. Although shareholders typically resist leverage reductions in canonical models (i.e., the ``leverage ratchet effect''), our model predicts...

What does market power look like in a data economy? We model data as fuel for prediction and study how it changes measured markups. Data has ambiguous effects on product markups: By reducing risk, it lowers markups. By prompting investment,...

Conventional wisdom holds that an incumbent bank would never voluntarily share proprietary borrower data with a competing lender. We study lending competition in which the incumbent owns data that generate informative signals about borrower quality and chooses how much to...