Papers
Uploaded: Oct 3, 2025
Debt and the Optimal Incentives Over Time
Using a backward stochastic differential equation (BSDE) framework, we examine the principal-agent problem in a finite-horizon continuous-time setting where the agent’s effort is a continuous choice, and the principal can impose non-pecuniary punishments. We show that the agent’s optimal incentive...
Uploaded: Oct 3, 2025
When Silicon Valley Meets Wall Street: A Theory of Financial Overengineering
We study a model `a la Kyle (1985) where a trading firm hires a financial engineer to develop proprietary technology for an informational edge. The signal produced through this hiring is firm-specific and non-contractible, leading to a bilateral monopoly in...
Uploaded: Oct 3, 2025
Capital Structure and ESG Integration
We analyze how borrowers’ capital structure affects their incentives to integrate ESG. Borrowers may pursue socially valuable but financially underperforming projects to reduce expected payments to outside investors. These financial gains are amplified when the payoffs of investor-held securities are...
Uploaded: Oct 2, 2025
A Model of Supplier Finance
We develop a theoretical model of supplier finance where an intermediary (e.g., a large buyer) pools trade credit and allocates liquidity across heterogeneous suppliers. Optimal supplier finance creates profit-driven liquidity cross-subsidization and explains selective supplier inclusion as an equilibrium outcome....
Uploaded: Sep 24, 2025
Open Banking under Maturity Transformation
This paper examines how the shift from closed banking to open banking --- where borrower data become accessible to more financial institutions --- affects lending competition, credit availability, and resource allocation in underbanked markets. We develop a common-value auction model...
Uploaded: Sep 16, 2025
Trading against Algorithms: Price Dynamics and Risk-sharing in a Market with Q-learners
We study pricing dynamics and risk-sharing in a market with rational investors and a Q-learning trader. The Q-learner’s trading generates a feedback loop in prices: their demand for the risky security depends on their perceived benefit from trading, which in...