An organization must often make a collective decision on behalf of two units that hold different private information, prefer different outcomes, and cannot use monetary transfers. We ask which unit’s information should...

A firm that wants innovation must attract workers whose suitability for exploration it cannot observe. Any contract that attracts explorers is also open to exploiters. In a two-period model with hidden actions,...

Recent asset pricing methods estimate investor-level demand for financial assets. We show that leading demand systems omit the central mechanism of portfolio choice: substitution depends on payoff similarity under a latent measure...

Foundation-model providers observe rich usage histories and sell technologically distinct tokens to users running heterogeneous and expanding applications. Users choose tasks involving model- and workflow-specific token recipes predicted imperfectly beforehand, whereas application purpose, prototype success, and downstream revenue remain difficult...

We develop a model of algorithmic trading in which a better-informed algorithm competes with human traders who choose whether to acquire costly information and participate in the market. We compare a model-free algorithm, which learns how to trade based on...

A monopolist data seller designs and sells signals about borrower quality to competing lenders. Optimal signals raise lenders' profits, and hence seller revenue, by softening lending competition through two channels. Segmentation negatively...