We study a situation in which a regulator relies on risk models that banks produce in order to regulate them. A bank can generate more than one model and choose which models to reveal to the regulator. The regulator can...

We characterize optimal contracts in settings where the principal observes informative signals over time about the agent's one-time action. If both are risk-neutral contract relevant features of any signal process can be represented by a deterministic informativeness process that is...

We study a bargaining model in which a buyer makes frequent offers to a privately informed seller, while gradually learning about the seller’s type from “news.” We show that the buyer’s ability to leverage this information to extract more surplus...

In dynamic financial markets the stochastic supply of risky assets has a significant informational role. Contrary to static models, where it acts as "noise," in dynamic markets stochastic supply contains information about risk premiums. Acquiring private dividend information helps investors...

We present a financial market with investors who have nested private information. Small perturbations of price informativeness, originating from fat-finger errors or algorithmic glitches of well-informed investors, can trigger an oscillating shock throughout the economy that destabilizes the feedback loop...

We propose a general equilibrium framework to analyze the cross-sectional distribution of credit and its exposure to shocks to the financial system, such as changes to bank capital, capital requirements, and interest rates. We characterize how over- and underinvestment in...