We examine how portfolio regulations affect risk sharing between financial institutions with market power. Unconstrained access to complete markets permits flexible exploitation of market power and induces inefficient risk sharing. Appropriate portfolio restrictions counteract this, improving liquidity and risk sharing...

A key function of financial intermediaries is to borrow in financial markets and lend to firms. I show that this creates informational linkages between repo and corporate bond markets. My key result is improving transparency in either market may lower...

Survey-based excess stock return forecasts are procyclical, less volatile, and more persistent than countercyclical statistical forecasts. These patterns challenge rational representative-agent models. We show that they arise naturally in fully rational heterogeneous-belief models with speculative trade. Prices reflect the market...

Standard demand elasticity estimation treats investors’ demand slopes as stable objects that can be traced out by exogenous residual supply shifts. We show this identification strategy fails in dynamic settings: supply shocks cause demand curves to tilt and shift through...

In opaque markets plagued by asymmetric information, firms borrow from many lenders at once and individual contracts are not observable to other lenders. We identify a novel information externality in a model based on such a setting. To avoid adverse...

We model stakeholder-driven institutional divestiture that promotes harmful-asset stranding through both an economic exposure channel and financial prices. We introduce two novel mechanisms. First, institutional divestiture weakens stakeholders' asset exposures, improving political conditions for stranding. Second, institutional divestiture credibly communicates...