Alice Hsiaw, Ing-Haw Cheng Nov 14,2022
Working Paper No.00047-01
Why do individuals interpret the same information differently? We propose that individuals follow Bayes' Rule when forming posteriors with one exception:... Read More
Chaojun Wang Nov 14,2022
Working Paper No.00084-00
On many important multi-dealer platforms, customers mostly request quotes from very few dealers. I build a model of multi-dealer platforms... Read More
Piero Gottardi,Humberto Moreira, William Fuchs Nov 15,2022
Working Paper No.00085-00
We consider a dynamic adverse selection model where privately informed sellers of divisible assets can choose how much of their... Read More
Alice Hsiaw, Ing-Haw Cheng Nov 15,2022
Working Paper No.00086-00
Why does misinformation persist, and how does it distort the long-run beliefs and actions of rational agents? Suppose receivers see... Read More
Qing Liu, Lucy White Andrea Buffa Nov 18,2022
Working Paper No.00073-01
Agents working together to produce a joint output care about each other’s incentives. Because real world contracts are typically private... Read More
Catherine Casamatta,Rui xiong, Matthieu Bouvard Nov 21,2022
Working Paper No.00087-00
We show that by lending to merchants and monitoring them, an e-commerce platform can price-discriminate between merchants with high and... Read More
Simon Mayer , Lin William Cong (叢林) Nov 28,2022
Working Paper No.00088-00
We model platform competition with endogenous data generation, collection, and sharing, thereby providing a unifying framework to evaluate data-related regulation... Read More
Simon Mayer , Lin William Cong (叢林) Nov 28,2022
Working Paper No.00089-00
We model the dynamic competition among national fiat currencies, cryptocurrencies, and Central Bank Digital Currencies (CBDCs), whereby countries strategically digitize... Read More
Kinda Hachem , Ana Babus Dec 02,2022
Working Paper No.00090-00
We develop a theory of financial innovation in which both market structure and the payoffs of the claims being traded... Read More
Johan Hombert, Bruno Biais , Pierre-Olivier Weill Mar 29,2021
Working Paper No.00070-00
Incentive problems make securities’ payoffs imperfectly pledgeable, limiting agents’ ability to issue liabilities. We analyze the equilibrium consequences of such... Read More