We study markets in which traders acquire private information before submitting their schedules. We characterize conditions under which traders over-invest (respectively, under-invest) in information and trade excessively (respectively, insufficiently) on their private signals. These inefficiencies arise from a novel interaction...

Trading relationships in over-the-counter (OTC) markets are persistent and often exclusive, despite technological advances that have expanded clients' access to dealers. We rationalize this pattern in a model where trading relationships allow dealers to learn their clients' trading motives from...

We develop a theoretical framework that formalizes the conflicts of interest arising in continuation vehicles (CVs), in which general partners (GPs) transfer portfolio companies from an existing fund to a new vehicle they continue to manage. While CVs can enhance...

We develop a Diamond-Dybvig-style model in which a non-bank firm issues tokens backed by its future services. Consumers face uncertain liquidity demand and costly ex-post borrowing. Tokens are partially liquid–they provide liquidity for the firm’s service but not other consumption
goods,...

Banks face a dual mandate of raising low-cost deposits while avoiding liquidity risk. We
propose a novel mechanism whereby banks use portfolio opacity to meet this objective.
Specifically, banks choose opaque portfolios to secure cheap long-term funding while
trading off insolvency and illiquidity....

Banks face a dual mandate of raising cheap deposits while avoiding liquidity risk. We propose a novel mechanism whereby banks use portfolio opacity to meet this objective. Specifically, banks choose opaque portfolios to secure cheap long-term funding while trading off...