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Demand Disagreement

Published: Journal of Financial Economics, 2026

Christian Heyerdahl-Larsen, Philipp Illeditsch

Disagreement about macroeconomic fundamentals accounts for only part of the disagreement about future interest rates, creating a ‘‘disagreement correlation’’ puzzle. This puzzle arises because standard equilibrium models with belief differences predict a strong link between asset return disagreement and fundamental...

Collateral Booms and Information Depletion

Uploaded: Nov 5, 2019

Vladimir Asriyan, Luc Laeven, Alberto Martin

We develop a new theory of information production during credit booms. Entrepreneurs need credit to undertake investment projects, some of which enable them to divert resources. Lenders can protect themselves from such diversion in two ways: collateralization and costly screening,...

Aggregation and Design of Information in Markets with Adverse Selection

Uploaded: Nov 5, 2019

Vladimir Asriyan

How effectively does a decentralized marketplace aggregate information that is dispersed throughout the economy? We study this question in a dynamic setting where sellers have private information that is correlated with an unobservable aggregate state. In any equilibrium, each seller's...

The Good, the Bad, and the Complex: Product Design with Imperfect Information

Uploaded: Nov 5, 2019

Dana Foarta, Victoria Vanasco

We study the joint determination of product quality and complexity in a rational setting. We introduce a novel notion of complexity, which affects how difficult it is for an agent to acquire information about product quality. In our model, an...

Pricing and Liquidity in Decentralized Asset Markets

Uploaded: Mar 27, 2019

Semih Uslu

I develop a search-and-bargaining model of endogenous intermediation in over-the-counter markets. Unlike the existing work, my model allows for rich investor heterogeneity in three simultaneous dimensions: preferences, inventories, and meeting rates. By comparing trading-volume patterns that arise in my model...

Corporate Liquidity Management under Moral Hazard

Uploaded: Mar 16, 2019

Barney Hartman-Glaser

We present a model of liquidity management and financing decisions under moral hazard in which a firm accumulates cash to forestall liquidity default. When the cash balance is high, a tension arises between accumulating more cash to reduce the probability...