We study contractual arrangements that support an efficient use of time in a knowledge-
intensive economy in which agents endogenously specialize in either production or consulting.
The resulting market for advice is plagued by informational problems, since both...

We study the effects of introducing competition for CEOs, assuming that the talent of
CEOs is not observable and that they can misreport their performance. Without competition
for talent, firms maximize their profits by offering inefficiently low-powered
...

Size-discovery mechanisms allow large quantities of an asset to be exchanged at a price
that does not respond to price pressure. Primary examples include \workup" in Treasury
markets, \matching sessions" in corporate bond and CDS markets, and block-trading

This paper studies the impact of increasing trading frequency in financial markets on
allocative efficiency. We build and solve a dynamic model of sequential double auctions
in which traders trade strategically with demand schedules. Trading needs are generated

We incorporate a search-theoretic model of imperfect competition into an otherwise standard model
of asymmetric information with unrestricted contracts. We develop a methodology that allows for
a sharp analytical characterization of the unique equilibrium, and then use this...

We develop a model to illustrate that equity-based compensation for non-executive
employees and product market decisions are related. When the product market is com-
petitive and employees have low bargaining power, the unique equilibrium is for each
...