We study the determinants of asset market fragmentation in a model with strategic investors that disagree about the value of an asset. Investors’ choices determine the market structure. Fragmented markets are supported in equilibrium when disagreement between investors is low....

Incentive problems make securities’ payoffs imperfectly pledgeable, limiting agents’ ability to issue liabilities. We analyze the equilibrium consequences of such endogenous incompleteness in a dynamic exchange economy. Because markets are endogenously incomplete, agents have different intertemporal marginal rates of substitution,...

Open banking facilitates data sharing consented by customers who generate the data, with a regulatory goal of promoting competition between traditional banks and challenger fintech entrants. We study lending market competition when sharing banks' customer data enables better borrower screening...

We characterize equilibrium leverage dynamics in a tradeoff model when the firm can continuously adjust leverage and cannot commit to a policy ex ante. While the leverage ratchet effect leads shareholders to issue debt gradually over time, asset growth and...

Open banking facilitates data sharing consented by customers who generate the data, with a regulatory goal of promoting competition between traditional banks and challenger fintech entrants. We study lending market competition when sharing banks’ customer data enables better borrower screening...

In sharp contrast to most previous crisis episodes, the Treasury market experienced severe stress and illiquidity during the COVID-19 crisis, raising concerns that the safe-haven status of U.S. Treasuries may be eroding. We document large shifts in Treasury ownership and...