Many financial contracts -- futures, options, and swaps -- are written on endogenous prices rather than primitive states of the world. How well can such markets approximate Arrow (1964)'s state-contingent contracts? We develop a tractable equilibrium model in which spot...

Traditionally, fund managers cast votes on behalf of fund investors. Recently, there is a shift toward "pass-through voting," with funds offering investors a choice: delegate votes to the fund or vote themselves. We develop a framework to study the implications...

We examine the governance implications of passive fund growth. In our model, investors allocate capital between passive funds, active funds, and private savings, and funds' fees and ownership stakes determine their incentives to engage in governance. If passive funds grow...

Blockchain technology holds the promise of transforming our financial system, but a key question lingers regarding whether this technology can ensure secure settlement. We develop an equilibrium model to study that question with regard to the most prominent blockchain type,...

We examine how portfolio regulations affect risk sharing between financial institutions with market power. Unconstrained access to complete markets permits flexible exploitation of market power and induces inefficient risk sharing. Appropriate portfolio restrictions counteract this, improving liquidity and risk sharing...

A key function of financial intermediaries is to borrow in financial markets and lend to firms. I show that this creates informational linkages between repo and corporate bond markets. My key result is improving transparency in either market may lower...