Why does misinformation persist, and how does it distort the long-run beliefs and actions of rational agents? Suppose receivers see an infinite stream of messages from a sender of unknown type who observes private signals about an unknown state of...

We consider a dynamic adverse selection model where privately informed sellers of divisible assets can choose how much of their asset to sell at each point in time to competitive buyers. With commitment, delay and lower quantities are equivalent ways to...

On many important multi-dealer platforms, customers mostly request quotes from very few dealers. I build a model of multi-dealer platforms where dealers strategically choose to respond or ignore a request. If the customer contacts more dealers, every dealer responds with...

Why do individuals interpret the same information differently? We propose that individuals follow Bayes' Rule when forming posteriors with one exception: when assessing the credibility of signal sources, they "double-dip" the data and use already updated beliefs instead of their priors. Individuals...

We develop an economic model to compare equilibrium security of Proof-of-Work (PoW) versus Proof-of-Stake (PoS) blockchains. We derive general conditions to determine when PoW blockchains are more secure than otherwise equivalent PoS blockchains and vice versa. Applying real-world parameter values...

We present a model in which informed experts intermediate in the market for going public by acquiring private firms and reselling their shares to public investors. Because information incorporated by the public market generates resale pricing risk for experts, the...