Featured Work
Aug 4, 2025
Moral hazard and the quest for linear contracts
30 min or 60 min fine.
This note derives three conditions under which affine or piecewise-linear contracts emerge in the classical principal-agent model of \cite{Holmstrom1979}. Specifically, augmenting fixed pay with equity or call
options is optimal when: (1) the agent has logarithmic utility, (2) the principal is risk-neutral, and (3) the agent's effort induces an exponential tilt in the output distribution. Importantly, as the baseline...
Jun 11, 2025
Martin Oehmke, Marcus Opp
| Working Paper No. 00162-00
Green Capital Requirements
We study bank capital requirements as a tool to address climate-related financial risks and evaluate whether a prudential mandate for bank regulators remains appropriate in the presence of carbon externalities. We show that a prudential mandate maximizes welfare if carbon taxes are set optimally and fully characterize optimal capital requirements under such a mandate. Optimal transition-risk adjustments can crowd out clean lending. When carbon pricing...
Mar 27, 2023
Martin Oehmke, Marcus Opp
| Working Paper No. 00093-00
A Theory of Socially Responsible Investment
We characterize the conditions under which a socially responsible (SR) fund induces firms to reduce externalities, even when profit-seeking capital is in perfectly elastic supply. Such impact requires that the SR fund's mandate permits the fund to trade off financial performance against reductions in social costs---relative to the counterfactual in which the fund does not invest in a given firm. Based on such an impact...
Oct 9, 2017
Florian Hoffmann, Roman Inderst,Florian Hoffmann, Roman Inderst, Marcus Opp
| Working Paper No. 00015-00
Only time will tell: A Theory of Deferred Compensation
We characterize optimal contracts in settings where the principal observes informative signals over time about the agent's one-time action. If both are risk-neutral contract relevant features of any signal process can be represented by a deterministic informativeness process that is increasing over time. The duration of pay trades off the gain in informativeness with the costs resulting from the agent's liquidity needs. The duration is...
Feb 1, 2017
Marcus Opp
| Working Paper No. 00021-00
Bank capital and the composition of credit
We propose a general equilibrium framework to analyze the cross-sectional distribution of credit and its exposure to shocks to the financial system, such as changes to bank capital, capital requirements, and interest rates. We characterize how over- and underinvestment in different parts of the borrower distribution are linked to the capitalization of the banking sector and the distribution of borrowers' risk characteristics and bank dependence....