Anthony Lee Zhang

Anthony Lee Zhang

Institution

University of Chicago Booth School of Business

PhD Year

2019

Email

anthony.zhang@chicagobooth.edu

FTG Membership

Member

Website

https://anthonyleezhang.github.io/

Featured Work

Automated Market Making and Loss-Versus-Rebalancing

May 6, 2026

Anthony Lee Zhang

Automated Market Makers (AMMs) are both liquidity sources and investment vehicles for market participants. This paper analyzes the risks and returns of liquidity provision (LP) investments in AMMs. In a continuous-time model, we show that LP returns decompose into a beta-like component reflecting market risk exposure, and an alpha-like component reflecting microstructural forces: accrued fees minus losses to arbitrageurs. Applying our decomposition to the Uniswap...


Corporate Governance by Workers

Mar 30, 2026

Anthony Lee Zhang, Hongda Zhong

What are the consequences of worker private information for corporate governance? When informed workers are compensated partly in equity, they may leave the firm if they observe low managerial effort, reducing the firm value and the manager’s own compensation. Counterintuitively, granting equity to workers can thus increase managers’ effort incentives, despite crowding out managers’ ownership in the firm. Worker equity also exerts downward pressure on...


Markets for Price Risk

Feb 27, 2026

Baiyang Han, Junyi Hu, Anthony Lee Zhang

Financial derivatives, such as futures, options, and swaps, are not contracts on exogenous states of the world, as in Arrow (1964): their payoffs depend on the endogenous market prices of certain goods. How well do markets for price risk approximate the richer state-contingent contracts analyzed by Arrow? We solve analytically for equilibrium trades, asset prices, and welfare in price-linked derivative contract markets, illustrating the role...


Data and Welfare in Credit Markets

Feb 1, 2026

Anthony Lee Zhang

We show how to measure the welfare effects arising from increased data availability. When lenders have more data on prospective borrower costs, they can charge prices that are more aligned with these costs. This increases total social welfare, and transfers surplus from borrowers to lenders. We show that the magnitudes of the welfare changes can be estimated using only quantity data and variation in prices....

Stablecoin Runs and the Centralization of Arbitrage

Feb 1, 2026

Anthony Lee Zhang

We analyze the run risk of fiat-backed stablecoins by uncovering a fundamental dilemma between stablecoins’ price stability and financial stability. We show that panic runs exist even though general investors only trade stablecoins in secondary markets with flexible prices. This is because stablecoins engage in liquidity transformation and the fixed price at which arbitrageurs redeem stablecoins for cash from the issuer in the primary market...

Digital Veblen Goods

Feb 1, 2026

Anthony Lee Zhang

We propose a new framework for understanding non-fungible tokens (NFTs), cryptoassets that typically represent digital artwork. We posit that NFTs are digital Veblen goods: consumers demand them partly because other consumers do. Demand for NFT collections is thus fragile; issuers respond by underpricing their NFTs in primary markets, creating profit opportunities for “scalpers.” We construct a simple model of NFT markets emphasizing social forces on...

The Pricing of Property Tax Revenues

Jun 30, 2025

Anthony Lee Zhang

A property tax can be thought of as a capital structure, which divides a stream of rents into components accruing to the homeowner and to the government. Near-term rents mainly accrue to homeowners, and far-term rents mainly accrue to governments. This characterization implies that the value of property tax revenues is very sensitive to interest rates, that governments funded by tax revenues have future-biased incentives...


Competition in the Cryptocurrency Exchange Market

Jun 30, 2025

Anthony Lee Zhang

Cryptocurrency exchange market structure is fragmented, since cryptocurrencies are fungible, but customers cannot move freely across cryptocurrency exchanges. We build a model where exchanges with captive customers are linked by arbitrageurs, showing that ``star-shaped'' equilibria can exist, in which arbitrageurs endogenously coordinate on one exchange as a liquidity hub. The model predicts that large exchanges' listing decisions should influence price dispersion, arbitrage flows, trade volumes,...