Martin Oehmke

Martin Oehmke

Institution

London School of Economics

PhD Year

2009

Email

m.oehmke@lse.ac.uk

FTG Membership

Member

Website

https://sites.google.com/site/moehmke/

Featured Work

Jun 11, 2025

Martin Oehmke, Marcus Opp | Working Paper No. 00162-00

Green Capital Requirements

We study bank capital requirements as a tool to address climate-related financial risks and evaluate whether a prudential mandate for bank regulators remains appropriate in the presence of carbon externalities. We show that a prudential mandate maximizes welfare if carbon taxes are set optimally and fully characterize optimal capital requirements under such a mandate. Optimal transition-risk adjustments can crowd out clean lending. When carbon pricing...


Mar 27, 2023

Martin Oehmke, Marcus Opp | Working Paper No. 00093-00

A Theory of Socially Responsible Investment

We characterize the conditions under which a socially responsible (SR) fund induces firms to reduce externalities, even when profit-seeking capital is in perfectly elastic supply. Such impact requires that the SR fund's mandate permits the fund to trade off financial performance against reductions in social costs---relative to the counterfactual in which the fund does not invest in a given firm. Based on such an impact...


Aug 7, 2020

Martin Oehmke

A Theory of Socially Responsible Investment

We characterize necessary conditions for socially responsible investors to impact firm behavior in a setting in which firm production generates social costs and is subject to financing constraints. Impact requires a broad mandate, in that socially responsible investors need to internalize social costs irrespective of whether they are investors in a given firm. Impact is optimally achieved by enabling a scale increase for clean production....

Mar 14, 2019

Martin Oehmke

The Tragedy of Complexity

This paper presents an equilibrium theory of product complexity. Complex products generate higher potential value, but require more attention from the consumer. Because consumer attention is a limited common resource, an attention externality arises: Sellers distort the complexity of their own products to grab attention from other products. This externality can lead to too much or too little complexity depending on product features and the...

Dec 14, 2016

Martin Oehmke | Working Paper No. 00007-00

Bank Resolution and the Structure of Global Banks

A theory framework to assess how global, too-big-to-fail banks can be successfully resolved by national regulators.