(In-)Visible Risks of Blockchain-Based Financing for Capital Allocation Efficiency

Apr 15, 2026

Dongkyu Chang, Kyoung Jin Choi, Keeyoung Rhee

Working Paper No. 00213-00

We analyze how blockchain-based financing affects capital allocation to provide early guidance for DeFi regulation. Competition with conventional financial firms raises borrowing costs, incentivizing DeFi firms to shirk their responsibility for managing investors’ funds. While blockchain technology enables collective monitoring, enhancing it without prudential regulation creates gambling dynamics: DeFi firms bet on evading detection when shirking, while investors bet on enforcing responsible behavior to secure higher repayments. Although an equilibrium exists where DeFi firms behave responsibly, it becomes less stable when investors are overly confident in coordinated monitoring, particularly in response to out-of-equilibrium offers with unexpectedly high shirk-inducing repayments.


Dongkyu Chang

Dongkyu Chang

Kyoung Jin Choi

Kyoung Jin Choi

Keeyoung Rhee

Keeyoung Rhee

Sungkyunkwan University (SKKU)