We develop a Diamond-Dybvig-style model in which a non-bank firm issues tokens backed by its future services. Consumers face uncertain liquidity demand and costly ex-post borrowing. Tokens are partially liquid–they provide liquidity for the firm’s service but not other consumption
goods, creating an endogenous liquidity premium. This premium is influenced by the imperfect substitution between tokens and fully liquid claims, leading to a non-monotonic relationship with the cost of illiquidity. The issuing firm has a stronger incentive to issue tokens when it provides high-value services with infrequent demand or when the demand for the service is positively correlated with the demand for other consumption goods. In terms of token design, we characterize conditions under which the firm may offer consumers more flexibility in token issuance and redemption, potentially making tokens tradable. For tradable tokens, the firm may also permit conversion back to cash at a one-to-one rate, resembling stablecoins prevailing in practice.