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Liyan Yang

Institution

Rotman School, University of Toronto

PhD Year

2010

Phone

416-978-3930

liyan.yang@rotman.utoronto.ca

FTG Membership

Member

Website

http://individual.utoronto.ca/liyanyang/

Featured Work

Oct 9, 2025

Tse-Chun Lin, Xiaorong Ma, Liyan Yang, Minxing Zhu

Payment Methods and Market Feedback in Mergers and Acquisitions

We document that all‑cash M\&A deals are substantially more likely to be withdrawn than non‑all‑cash deals (mixed-pay or all‑stock) and that withdrawal decisions are more sensitive to announcement‑period acquirer returns when financing is all‑cash. Motivated by these stylized facts, we develop a model in which managers learn about deal synergies from post‑announcement prices, with the payment method shaping the informativeness of this feedback. Under equity...

Jul 6, 2018

Liyan Yang | Working Paper No. 00035-00

Commodity Financialization and Information Transmission

We study how commodity financialization affects information transmission and aggre-
gation in a commodity futures market. The trading of financial traders injects both
fundamental information and unrelated noise into the futures price. Thus, price in-
formativeness in the futures market can either increase or decrease with commodity
financialization. When the price-informativeness e¤ect is negative, the futures price
bias can increase...

Jul 6, 2018

Francesco Bova, Liyan Yang | Working Paper No. 00036-00

Employee Bargaining Power, Inter-Firm Competition, and Equity-Based Compensation

We develop a model to illustrate that equity-based compensation for non-executive
employees and product market decisions are related. When the product market is com-
petitive and employees have low bargaining power, the unique equilibrium is for each
firm's owners to o¤er equity-based compensation to their employees. In this setting,
equity-based compensation leads to a lower wage rate, which makes each firm...

Nov 21, 2017

Liyan Yang | Working Paper No. 00018-00

Disclosure, Competition, and Learning from Asset Prices

This paper studies the classic information-sharing problem in a duopoly setting in which firms learn information from a financial market. By disclosing information, a firm incurs a proprietary cost of losing competitive advantage to its rival firm but benefits from learning from a more informative asset market. Firms' disclosure decisions can exhibit strategic complementarity, which is strong enough to support both a disclosure equilibrium and...