We introduce nonrival public goods into global games of regime change and rationalize investor behavior in the Euro crisis, the collapse of Terra, and the 2023 bank runs. Each investor in a large project is vanishingly unlikely to be pivotal for its survival. She also benefits from the project’s enormous public goods. In equilibrium, this large benefit precisely counterbalances her vanishing pivotal likelihood, such that...

With complete-information bilateral bargaining in network settings, holdup is eliminated when contracts across the network are agreed atomically (all or none) via a smart contract. Applications include over-the-counter trading, syndicated lending, multi-tranche securitizations, third-party financed purchases, and bookbuilding. Under a novel extensive-form bargaining protocol, any firm can give a “greenlight” to the terms of a contract proposed to that firm, which automatically converts those terms...

On many important multi-dealer platforms, customers mostly request quotes from very few dealers. I build a model of multi-dealer platforms where dealers strategically choose to respond or ignore a request. If the customer contacts more dealers, every dealer responds with a lower probability and offers a stochastically worse price when responding. These two negative effects overturn the customer's benefit from potentially receiving more quotes, worsening...