This issue of FTG Insights highlights some surprising equilibrium implications of regulations and technological advancement, which are at odds with what some would argue is common wisdom. “From Market Making to Matchmaking: Does Bank Regulation Harm Market Liquidity?” demonstrates that raising capital requirements for banks can, in the presence of competition from nonbank liquidity providers, lead to lower average trading costs for customers. The higher capital requirements lead banks to switch their activity towards matching buyers and sellers, rather than directly participating in trades, which can enhance investor welfare. “Disclosing to Informed Traders” illustrates the downside of policymakers adopting one-size-fits-all disclosure rules. It shows that equilibrium outcomes of disclosure requirements depend crucially on whether investors are also privately informed and how they interpret silence. More stringent disclosure requirements can lead some firms to conceal more, but at the same time can lead others to reveal more information voluntarily. “Technological Progress and Rent Seeking” shows that while technological improvements make inputs more productive, they also make it easier for firms to appropriate the higher production of others. As technologies improve, they disproportionally prompt more rent extraction, decoupling economic growth from technological progress. Finally, modern financial institutions have access to an array of sophisticated risk management tools that allow them to bundle risks in creative ways to enhance diversification, suggesting banks should have become more resilient over time. “Booms, busts, and common risk exposures” challenges this perceived wisdom by showing that superior risk management technologies can increase the overlap between banks’ portfolios and thereby make the system more rather than less fragile.