Martin Szydlowski
Institution
HKUST
PhD Year
2013
mszydlowski@ust.hk
FTG Membership
Member
Website
https://sites.google.com/site/martinszydl/home
Featured Work
Sep 22, 2020
Monitor Reputation and Transparency
We study the disclosure policy of a regulator overseeing a monitor with reputation
concerns, such as a bank or an auditor. The monitor oversees a manager, who chooses
how much to manipulate given the monitor's reputation. Reputational incentives are
strongest for intermediate reputations and uncertainty about the monitor is valuable.
Instead of providing transparency, the regulator's disclosure keeps the monitor's reputation
Sep 21, 2018
The Market for Conflicted Advice
We present a model of the market for advice in which advisers have conflicts of
interest and compete for heterogeneous customers through information provision. The
competitive equilibrium features information dispersion and partial disclosure. While
conflicted fees lead to distorted information, they are irrelevant for customers’ welfare:
banning conflicted fees only improves the information quality, not customers’ welfare.
Instead, financial literacy...
