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Competition for Talent under Performance Manipulation

Ivan Marinovic , Paul Povel   Jul 08,201823

We study the effects of introducing competition for CEOs, assuming that the talent of CEOs is not observable and... Read More

Published: Journal of Accounting and Economics, 2017, 64(1), 1-14

Competition for Talent under Performance Manipulation

Ivan Marinovic , Paul Povel   Jul 08,201823

We study the effects of introducing competition for CEOs, assuming that the talent of CEOs is not observable and... Read More

Published: Journal of Accounting and Economics, 2017, 64(1), 1-14

Competition for Talent under Performance Manipulation

Ivan Marinovic , Paul Povel   Jul 08,201823

We study the effects of introducing competition for CEOs, assuming that the talent of CEOs is not observable and... Read More

Published: Journal of Accounting and Economics, 2017, 64(1), 1-14

Competition for Talent under Performance Manipulation

Ivan Marinovic , Paul Povel   Jul 08,201823

We study the effects of introducing competition for CEOs, assuming that the talent of CEOs is not observable and... Read More

Published: Journal of Accounting and Economics, 2017, 64(1), 1-14

Competition for Talent under Performance Manipulation

Ivan Marinovic , Paul Povel   Jul 08,201823

We study the effects of introducing competition for CEOs, assuming that the talent of CEOs is not observable and... Read More

Published: Journal of Accounting and Economics, 2017, 64(1), 1-14

Competition for Talent under Performance Manipulation

Ivan Marinovic , Paul Povel   Jul 08,201823

We study the effects of introducing competition for CEOs, assuming that the talent of CEOs is not observable and... Read More

Published: Journal of Accounting and Economics, 2017, 64(1), 1-14

Competition for Talent under Performance Manipulation

Ivan Marinovic , Paul Povel   Jul 08,201823

We study the effects of introducing competition for CEOs, assuming that the talent of CEOs is not observable and... Read More

Published: Journal of Accounting and Economics, 2017, 64(1), 1-14

Competition for Talent under Performance Manipulation

Ivan Marinovic , Paul Povel   Jul 08,201823

We study the effects of introducing competition for CEOs, assuming that the talent of CEOs is not observable and... Read More

Published: Journal of Accounting and Economics, 2017, 64(1), 1-14

Proxy Advisory Firms: The Economics of Selling Information to Voters

Nadya Malenko , Andrey Malenko   Dec 13,2016

Proxy advisors play an important role by providing investors with research and recommendations on how to vote their shares. This... Read More

Selling to Advised Buyers

Anton Tsoy , Andrey Malenko   Dec 13,2016

In many cases, buyers are not fully informed about their valuations and rely on the advice of biased experts. For... Read More